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In October 2022, when Rishi Sunak assumed office as the UK's leader, he was the fifth UK leader to occupy the position over a six-year span.

Unleashed on the UK by Brexit, this represented exceptional governmental instability. So what term captures what is occurring in France, now on its sixth premier in two years – with three in the past 10 months?

The latest prime minister, the recently reappointed Sébastien Lecornu, may have gained a brief respite on Tuesday, sacrificing Emmanuel Macron’s key pension reform in exchange for opposition Socialist votes as the price for his administration's continuation.

But it is, in the best case, a temporary fix. The EU’s second-largest economy is trapped in a ongoing governmental crisis, the likes of which it has not experienced for many years – possibly not since the establishment of its Fifth Republic in 1958 – and from which there seems no easy escape.

Governing Without a Majority

Essential context: from the moment Macron initiated an risky early parliamentary vote in 2024, the nation has had a hung parliament separated into three opposing factions – the left, the far right and his own centre-right alliance – none with anything close to a majority.

At the same time, the nation faces dual debt and deficit crises: its national debt level and budget shortfall are now nearly double the EU threshold, and strict legal timelines to approve a 2026 budget that at least begins to rein in spending are approaching.

In this challenging environment, both Lecornu’s immediate predecessors – Michel Barnier, who served from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who took office from December 2024 to September 2025 – were removed by parliament.

In mid-September, the president appointed his close ally Lecornu as his latest PM. But when, just over a fortnight later, Lecornu presented his government team – which turned out to be much the same as the old one – he encountered anger from allies and opponents alike.

To such an extent that the following day, he stepped down. After only 27 days as premier, Lecornu became the briefest-serving prime minister in modern French history. In a dignified speech, he cited political rigidity, saying “partisan attitudes” and “certain egos” would make his job all but impossible.

A further unexpected development: just hours after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron requested he remain for another 48 hours in a final attempt to salvage cross-party backing – a mission, to put it mildly, not without complications.

Next, two of Macron’s former PMs publicly turned on the struggling leader. Meanwhile, the right-wing RN and leftist LFI refused to meet Lecornu, promising to vote down all future administrations unless there were early elections.

Lecornu stuck at his job, talking to everyone who was prepared to hear him out. At the conclusion of his extension, he went on TV to say he believed “a path still existed” to prevent a vote. The leader's team announced the president would name a fresh premier two days later.

Macron kept his promise – and on that Friday reappointed Sébastien Lecornu. So this week – with Macron commenting from the wings that the country’s rival political parties were “fuelling division” and “solely responsible for this chaos” – was Lecornu’s critical test. Could he survive – and can he pass that vital budget?

In a critical address, the young prime minister spelled out his budget priorities, giving the Socialist party, who oppose Macron’s unpopular pension overhaul, what they were expecting: Macron’s flagship reform would be suspended until 2027.

With the right-wing LR already on board, the Socialists said they would not back censorship votes proposed against Lecornu by the extremist factions – meaning the administration would likely endure those ballots, due on Thursday.

It is, however, by no means certain to be able to pass its planned €30bn budget squeeze: the PS clearly stated that it would be seeking more concessions. “This,” said its leader, Olivier Faure, “is just the start.”

A Cultural Shift

The problem is, the more Lecornu cedes to the centre-left, the more he will meet resistance from the centre-right. And, like the PS, the right-leaning parties are themselves divided over how to handle the new government – some are still itching to topple it.

A look at the seat numbers shows how difficult his mission – and future viability – will be. A total of 264 deputies from the far-right RN, LFI, Greens, Communists and hardline-right UDR want him out.

To achieve that, they need a 288-vote majority in parliament – so if they can convince only 24 of the PS’s 69 members or the LR’s 47 representatives (or both) to support their motion, Macron’s fifth unstable premier in 24 months is, similar to his forerunners, toast.

Few would bet against that happening sooner rather than later. Although, by an unlikely turn, the dysfunctional assembly musters collective will to approve a budget this year, the prospects for the government beyond that look bleak.

So does an exit exist? Early elections would be unlikely to solve the problem: polls suggest pretty much every party bar the RN would see reduced representation, but there would still be no clear majority. A new prime minister would confront identical numerical challenges.

Another possibility might be for Macron himself to step down. After winning the presidential election, his successor would dissolve parliament and aim for a legislative majority in the ensuing legislative vote. But this also remains unclear.

Surveys show the future president will be Marine Le Pen or Jordan Bardella. There is at least an strong possibility that France’s voters, having elected a far-right president, might reconsider giving them parliamentary power.

In the end, France may not escape its predicament until its politicians acknowledge the changed landscape, which is that decisive majorities are a thing of the past, absolute victory is obsolete, and negotiation doesn't mean defeat.

Many think that transformation will not be feasible under the country’s current constitution. “This is no conventional parliamentary crisis, but a crise de régime” that will prove anything but temporary.

“The system wasn't built to encourage – and actively discourages – the formation of ruling alliances common in the rest of Europe. The Fifth Republic could be in its final stage.”